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POINT DE VUE 
« L A GUERRE DE TROIE 
N'A PAS EU LIEU » 
KOSOVO : SUPERVISION AND PUNISHMENT 
Stephanos Pesmazoglou* 
Andiomache : 
« The war of Troy Will not t ake p lace » 
Hector (decisively) : 
« The War of Troy w i l l take place » 
A re-reading of the Kosovo imbroglio is more than informative in itself : It 
sheds new light on what followed in the international scene since 1999 (11/9, 
Afghanistan and Iraq). Conflicting liberal visions were already there. Which 
« New World Order » ? Multilateralism or Imperial Unilateralism ? What is the 
content of multilateralism and is it malleable-adaptable to each conjuncture 
opening the way to absolute relativism and multiple standards ? Is it National 
Sovereignty that will be the absolute governing principle of international be-
havior or are Human and Minority Rights the unconditional presupposition 
determining what is to be done or finally is it a combination of the two or 
many more factors to be defined in each case by the mightiest ? Who confers 
legitimacy to military interventions, wars and even preventive wars ? The 
United Nations, NATO or la raison du plus fort ? What future for US-European 
relations ? Finally, international laws and international institutions such as 
the UN and the International Court of Justice will they be institutions of legi­
timacy for ail or instruments in the strategy of a few ? 
In the particular framework of Yugoslav and Balkan history it is hardly 
possible to disentangle Ariadne's thread'. The project gets more and more com-
plex the further one goes back into the « labyrinth » from the era of modem 
nation-state formation into the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires and further 
back to the Byzantine era (and for some cases into the Macedonian and 
' Professor at the Department of Political Science and History, Panteion University, Athens. 
(stpesm@panteion.gr) 
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Hellenic antiquity). 
MORALISTIC AND POLITICAL RELATIVISM 
NATO Declarative Rhetoric 
There is no need to repeat what was heard and seen ad nauseam during 
the three months of the air-war in Kosovo. The central globally drummed 
NATO « narrative », revolved around two or three complementary themes. A 
basic principle of the propagandistic campaign - and this was well assimilated 
by all « spokesmen » - was the need of one enemy, one and clearly delineated 
enemy during this specific historical conjecture. The absolute enemy, the ab-
solute evil for the past fifty years in political discourse and the culture indus-
try - films, seriais - is Hitler and the Nazis (testified by the innumerable WWII 
films and documentaries) : Saddam Hussein-Hitler of the Middle East seven 
years ago, Nasser-Hitler of Egypt during the Anglo-French intervention in 
Suez-40 years ago. And evil was sufficiently there in Yugoslavia to be condem-
ned with no need to redefine it at even higher pitch as historically absolute 
evil. Manichaistic schemas were not anew : they were rather permanently pre­
sent in American mentalities : « USSR : The Evil Empire », and nowadays, « The 
Axis of Evil ». I would say, the largest spectrum of the liberal and the left cul-
tural academe (certainly not all), did not realize that different political actors, 
as incarnated in individuals and institutions, with totally different ends and 
different hierarchies, used and abused superficially liberalism's conceptual 
toolbox centered around human rights. The « recycling » of the liberal vocabu-
lary on Human Rights and the resignification of memories formative for us 
(holocaust and deportees) was systematically worked out. Re-interpretation of 
humanitarian-moral terms was essential to disguise interests (mainly US 
world-wide « power projection »). 
What is of interest is that NATO, a military organization, colonized the li­
beral and left armory and that this colonization occurred suddenly with no 
previous signais. The immediate past - as well as the immediate future - was 
characterized by an altogether different language and different practices dis-
interested in Human Rights, in fact supporting dozens of regimes violating 
them. Violations perpetrated the very moment of the bombing in one of the 
members of the « alliance of democratic States » (Turkey) and/or supported by 
the USA and the UK in the case of Jakarta (against East Timor). Summarily : An 
operation of huge proportions - a « crusade of angels » as it was self-baptized 
- which was all at once a military, technological, economie, propagandistic 
operation, undermined international law (on ways and means of declaring 
and conducting a war), by-passed international institutions (UN), ignored the 
« law of the land » (every single constitution of the states participating) and 
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even invalidated the defensive nature of the NATO charter. As no legal-inter-
national or internal-constitutional basis existed for the participation in this 
war, this seems to be the essential reason why this war was never formally de-
clared. Such a crusade, to surpass all legalistic constraints but retaining its le­
gitimation, ought to be servicing a very big and sanctified good cause, such as 
Human Rights. It is this sort of globalizing discourse which obliterates its unsta-
ted ambition for world domination by justifying its interventionism on moral 
terminology. 
If legitimation is a first priority for the post-modern prince, its discourse 
strategy is invigorated by the concomitant propagandistic process of collective 
criminalization of the enemy. Thus, the penal argument is added to the moral-
humanitarian. The unjust, criminal enemy calls for the one global policeman 
just to strike militarily and thus punish the « criminal ». 
This Crusade for Human Rights by a « providential » military alliance goes 
hand in hand with three processes. I refer to them epigrammatically. Process 
number one : In the sphere of social psychology compassion is solely expressed 
for the Albanian refugees and with an allure of evangelical idealism in the 
West. At the antipodes Russia and most of Southeastern Europe (including 
Greece) where compassion is expressed solely for the bombarded Serbs, as if 
the Serbs were the only crucified in the region. A « humanitarian war » fought 
as if humanity does not comprise Albanians and Serbs alike. Process number 
two, also in the psychological sphere contempt, defiance and hubris is expres­
sed towards the whole world - as if the world is strictly defined as Northern 
America and Europe - international law trespassed, international institutions 
manipulated. As for the Balkans paraphrasing Bismarck's famous saying, 
which has been pulled out by numerous commentators, depicted officiai NATO 
mentalities : « The Balkans are not worth the healthy bones of a single NATO 
soldier. [Pomeranian grenadier] ». They are nothing more than « collateral da­
mage ». Process number three : the bombing of Serbia. Yugoslav television net­
works were hit as part of NATO's crusade for another value : to impose the 
« Kingdom of truth » all you have to do is to bomb lies and propaganda. It is the 
social and economic infrastructure that is targeted, up to two thousand civi-
lians are killed (tens of thousands injured), the cultural heritage is not spared 
-and present and future living is jeopardized by environmental « side-effects ». 
The evasive legitimating argumentation for military intervention. 
The arguments which have been put forward to oppose officiai NATO rhe-
toric and to deligitimate its military operation in Serbia, and which are of re-
levance today could be classified into three categories. They are the following : 
a. The necessity and the « morality » of humanitarian assistance as a form 
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of urgent intervention across national borders to help regions afflicted from 
natural catastrophes has not been ever questioned. Nobody questions the need 
to assist areas in a state of emergency because of earthquake, flood, famine or 
afflicted from contiguous epidemics. But when human suffering provoked by 
maltreatment and torture often leading to executions is at stake, then there is, 
if not outright rejection, great reservation in trespassing national sovereignty. 
Assuming that we believe, as some of us do, that it is not any more possible to 
tolerate atrocities to be committed under the cover of National Sovereignty by 
a criminal regime, then the question arises : Who decides, where and through 
which procedures and with which (violent or not) means to intervene ? 
b. A second category of objections is the following : Who and with what 
criteria orders the rank of importance in Human Rights violation (civil rights, 
social rights, etc.) ? A very subjectivist rationale in the hierarchy of values can 
easily prevail. What does it mean in our epoch of accelerating extreme in-
equalities to declare that we honor human rights, when the world's misery as 
depicted with sheer starvation numbers has dramatically deteriorated ? But 
than the problem of hierarchy arises. Which region of the world afflicted by 
civil rights problems to select ? We cannot and should not stand-by without 
doing something, thus skipping the hierarchy of rights objection. 
Nevertheless, the dangers become apparent of what constitutes relativism in 
relation to fundamental values in politics. The danger - i.e. the regionally more 
powerful and the globally mightiest - determines at will normality (and its ex­
ceptions), legality (and illegality), stability and security (and their opposites). 
c. A third category of delegitimizing arguments is associated with the 
West's penal record. How come that countries with a loaded penal record get 
legitimized to decide all by themselves to intervene in third countries viola-
ting human rights ? As it has been stated Vietnam was bombed with more 
bombs than the ones thrown during World War II, in the name of democracy 
and saving it from communism. The Anglo-French intervention in Suez had no 
relation whatsoever on how democratic the Nasser regime was in Egypt. To 
this very legitimate argumentation one could retort, and could à la rigueur be 
acceptable, that the intervention in Kosovo is only a beginning to put straight 
all past sins and secure present and future righteousness. But, then, an addi-
tional questioning reverberates : How is it still possible for a country (Turkey) 
that actually perpetrated at the time well documented crimes against its own 
ethnie community (the Kurds) to take part in the bombing with the same pla­
nes and the same airports that a few hours earlier had been bombing Kurdish 
villages ? But then we could, still, assume that Kosovo was the starting-point 
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for an in-depth catharsis (or self-catharsis) of NATO itself and each one of its 
member states separately, since they must act as exemplary models for the 
rest of the world1. 
All previous de-legitimizing objections have been more or less exposed by 
most critical commentators and some legal experts. This sort of approach, al-
beit their often legalistic nature, lead to outright moral condemnation. 
Discounting only temporarily, for the sake of the argument, the above grounds 
of objection, I will concentrate, alternatively, on what I consider of overriding 
importance. When we say that some terrible crime was about to happen and a 
previous one had been perpetrated, and something had to be done, with which 
we could all agree, before even thinking of using military means what we 
need to know is first, if the whole range of non-military means was exhausted 
and, second, if they were used in the direction of peaceful conflict-resolution 
and not in the direction of polarization. And, public deliberations should be at 
the epicenter well before decisions to act militarily are taken. For, otherwise, 
all those who with the greatest sang-froid declared or supported that the air-
raids would continue up to the « final destruction and annihilation » of Serbia, 
if needed, have no alibi whatsoever for the additional crimes against huma-
nity committed on top of the previous regional ones. And the issue is the fol-
lowing : I did not detect one article, one officiai NATO or governmental report, 
one survey that presented analytically and convincingly all the main non-mi­
litary means used during the past decade to prevent the turn of events not 
only in Kosovo but also in Bosnia and Croatia. Such a report could limit itself to 
all the basics that can be found in any good textbook of international relations. 
And the means for peaceful conflict resolution, as described by leading 
European experts in the field, are not one or two but a whole range of them. For 
example which economic means had been used not only as pressure but as in­
centives as well ? Which diplomatic instruments have been promoted as des­
cribed in the UN Charter ? Which policies in cultural and educational diplo-
macy have been propounded ? I.e. all the ingredients described by Joseph Nye 
as soft power. In fact, most articles, studies and books referring to the late 
1980s and the 1990s tend to suggest that the flow of politicians, diplomats, spe­
cial envoys, experts, balkaniologists and academies that passed from the grea-
ter area instead of supporting democratie opposition forces were characterized 
1 But, a different reply seems to corne from David Owen, the ex-British foreign minister, undercutting the 
above reservation. In a reply to Nemtsov, the former Russian Deputy Prime Minister. Flora Lewis, an au-
thoritative columnist reporting for the International Herald Tribune affirms that « he [Nemtsov] (...) corn-
plained harshly about the double standards that Washington applies penal record’ to punish Serbia 
when it ignores the lrilling of tens of thousands of Kurds in Turkey. [he asked Owen] So then, do you [in­
tend to] bomb Istanbul ? » According to Flora Lewis « he reported with some shock that (...) Owen ans-
wered, "No, because Turkey is in NATO" ». No disclaimer was issued. International Herald Tribune, 
10/08/99. 
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by three factors : Ignorance of the complexity of the problems and the menta-
lities involved ; Arrogant attitudes combined with disinterest and tutoring 
predispositions ; All the above predetermined their positive stand towards the 
authorities - be it the Milosevic regime or the UÇK leadership. 
My argument, in the remaining parts of this paper will have as a point of 
departure the mere fact that no overall review in the above directions was ever 
published, no evaluation of means and ends was ever presented. Debate and 
argumentation and all their emancipatory strength - the sine qua non of de­
mocratie and liberal theory (and practice) - was substituted by force by direct 
military action. 
The Elusive criteria of Western entanglement in Yugoslavia 
We could safely say, that there was never in history a policy for an idea in 
its pure form, however great it has been such as for example in the recent mo-
bilization for Human Rights, which did not take into consideration various 
interests of the parties involved. Similarly there were never policies expressing 
sheer power, politics and bare interests that did not fly at the same time some 
sort of credo-flagship, some central legitimizing idea, a just cause : once « in 
the name of the Cross fighting the Crescent », the « pious » fought the « infi-
dels » in the crusades ; once in the name of the protection of the Sudetes, 
Czechoslovakia was dismembered in 1938 by the Third German Reich and 30 
years later, in 1968, in the name of Socialist Internationalist ideals of justice, it 
was re-invaded by Soviet tanks. In the name of the protection of the Serbian 
minority in Kosovo the area was declared by the Yugoslav authorities in a state 
of siege in the late 1980s and in the name of saving the Albanians from ethnic 
cleansing NATO bombed Yugoslavia. If interests without a value legitimation 
are barely conceivable, the opposite is also true : The Human Rights argument 
totally disassociated from interests cannot mobilize people and armies. It may 
be possible in a society of Angels : in Utopia-land yes ; in the real world no. It 
is as if we could have ever had the war in Kosovo in the name of Human Rights, 
if it actually was against American interests. Or as if we could have ever had 
such a mobilization without a declared major just cause. Let us pull Ariadne's 
thread together. 
a. NATO referred for the first time officially and publicly to « Strategie 
interests in the Balkans and the whole Southeastern European region » one 
month after the end of their strikes. Nevertheless, the necessity of immediate 
military intervention in Yugoslavia was initially argued with fervor on the 
basis that there was an imminent danger of a generalized war in the Balkans. 
In the West the strength of the Balkans as metaphor of violence and brutality 
is there and easily exploitable to win public opinion. The war was depicted in 
maps involving not only Serbia and Albania, but pointing the destabilization 
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of the whole region. The Balkans as an erupted volcano appeared in most 
American TV networks on the basis of maps designed and released by the 
State Department. This danger of destabilization was projected during the va-
rious briefings as one of the major justifications of intervention. Therefore, 
from the very beginning, it is worthwhile reminding, that the undeclared war 
was not only in the name of a « just cause » to revert ethnic cleansing but by 
the invocation of some sort of major threat to western security. 
b. Notwithstanding the initial alarmist statements for a generalized flare-
up in the Balkans, in effect, unidentifiable strategic interests in the area were 
not the central theme in the Alliance's rhetoric. What was the cri du coeur was 
an undeniable truth, i.e. the violation of Human Rights of the Albanians in 
Kosovo. I suspect or discern that behind and beyond the undeniable initial and 
ultimate main culpable i.e. antagonistic Balkan nationalisms - with prevalent, 
of course, Serbian nationalism -, one can detect the latent shadow of a Euro-
American - in essence Germano-American - malaise not disassociated, of 
course, with a Franco-German malaise well documented since the reunifica­
tion of Germany : a diffused and lingering fears of renewed German power. 
Which does not necessarily mean an antagonism of interests. Rather it is a 
competition of influences or even better described, an antagonism for the pre­
vention of spheres of influence from third parties. This is my reading of mu-
tual perceptions and suspicions at the period (and not altered four years later 
when a common French-German statement countered US efforts for a UN re­
solution for bombing Iraq). 
The West, whereas involved in the Balkans from the very beginning - and 
all-through the various critical stages - in the process of talking about conflict 
resolution, it manages, to a greater or lesser extent, to accentuate the conflict. It 
is initially expressed through the leaking of evidence pointing to German sup­
port for the secession of Slovenia and Croatia. One can solidly assume that the 
Serbian-Yugoslav leadership was well aware of this predisposition and that it 
functioned as a threat. As a concept, as a feeling or as a conspiratorial construc­
tion this threat becomes fatally central as an alibi, for the self-perpetuation of 
the Milosevic regime, and the mobilization initially of all ideological and pro-
pagandistic mechanisms on a nationalist basis (Serbia the « Celestial 
Country »). Finally, mechanisms clamping down all sorts of contest, inaugura-
ting states of siege (in Kosovo) and mass killings (in Bosnia) were engaged. 
What functions as a convincing future prospect for Slovenia and Croatia fonc­
tions as a threat for Yugoslavia. The feeling of threat will remain constantly 
present in Yugoslavia later exacerbated with writings and utterances on 
Independence for Kosovo, « Greater Albania » - and even « Greater Bulgaria » in 
case Macedonia - did not function submissively as an American protectorate. 
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The first stage of the Yugoslav drama ends up after a very swift and blood-
less war in Slovenia and a second bloody war in Croatia, the well-established 
German tour de force within the European Union dictating the recognition of 
the two countries. This development of the first post-WWII Unified Germany 
mobilization was considered significant as the first indication of Germany's 
move to the political forefront. It was a move with great weight for future 
European developments. It will help to provoke the silent and latent intensifi­
cation of Anglo-American interest in the Southern Balkans (Macedonia, 
Albania and therefore, Kosovo, and Bulgaria). 
Second crucial stage is Bosnia and the stand of Western powers. For three 
and a half years Sarajevo is bombed by Serbian military forces from the hills 
surrounding it in an undeclared war. During the same period, as we know, the 
whole of Bosnia is ravaged by Serbian and Croatian forces alike. The Dayton-
Ohio agreement reflects a triple apartheid : « the exchange of populations » 
i.e. an euphemism used by the Milosevic regime ; mutual ethnic cleansing is 
legitimized by the West - contrary to what it was pledging ; up to two million 
people are displaced from their homelands. Bosnia was viewed as a neutral re­
gion, an area of power equilibrium not of interests but of various influences. 
In the inter-war period (between the Bosnian and the Kosovo war), NATO 
and the US in particular, continue to keep-up polarization or even to accen-
tuate it. They are negotiating and they are backing in practice Milosevic as the 
only charismatic and respectable interlocutor as described in Holbrooke's 
book, just a couple of months before the war against Yugoslavia, late 1998. In 
the same period, America recognizes UÇK as an interlocutor thus weakening, 
the pacifist elected leader of the Kosovar Albanians2. This period of further po­
larization will end up with Rambouillet, a treaty, commonly admitted, no 
European country with some self-respect would have ever signed. For several 
analysts Rambouillet was a clear-cut case of not taking seriously the diploma­
tic route to conflict resolution. In the chain of competitive hubris and of collec­
tive nationalist crimes, the Milosevic regime leading the way seems to go 
ahead with a second wave of ethnie cleansing of Kosovo Albanians. But here a 
different reading could indicate that it was not really sensitivities on Human 
Rights that mobilized NATO military apparatus, but that it was the non-com-
pliance of Milosevic to the proposais in regard to Kosovo that were directly 
interwoven with American designs on Albania and the Southern Balkans. 
2 Charles King, a Professor of Balkan Studies, at Georgetown University notes : « The refusai to address 
the Kosovo question while perhaps crucial to bringing Milosevic to the table, undercut the power of 
Rugova and threw the Kosovar leadership into the hands of a much younger, more radical coterie of 
Albanians, financed from abroad and committed to winning a separate state through violence (...) In 
April 1996, European recognition of New Yugoslavia before any settlement on Kosovo further discredited 
Rugova's pacifie approach ». King (Charles), « Where the West went wrong. The real driving forces be-
hind the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo », Times Literary Supplement, 07/05/99. 
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The West seems, using King's expression, to have selected the ultimate 
perversion : after the dismemberment of Bosnia, it is now passively accepting 
the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo but with a reversai : If something is legitimized 
in this case, it is the constitution of ethnically cleansed homogeneous small 
and non-viable states. Exactly what was decided and signed in Dayton/Ohio 
with the formation of three ghettos each « unhappy » ethnic group with its 
own patch of land, then ruthlessly pursued by Milosevic and against which 
NATO intervened succeeding what Milosevic did not. But this time it is the 
other way round : the massive desertion from Kosovo by its Serbian popula­
tion, persecuted by Albanian « rebels » (in other cases used as a synonym for 
terrorists). Nothing seems to be left of the purported objective of a « multicul-
tural' Kosovo ». 
Political and Economie vectors of discursive relativism 
It is interests that do not find a place in preaches or writings by intellec-
tuals and journalists and in public utterances of politicians and militaries. The 
concept of interests does not necessarily relate to the classical meaning of the 
term, nor does it refer to conspiracy theories pointing at some hidden interests3. 
I will schematically state the content that the concept of interests could be in-
fused taking into consideration the very concrete politico-historical determi­
nants of the present conjuncture. 
NATO cornes first having officially waged a non-declared war. Instead of 
the dissolution of NATO and the creation of a new European defense structure 
- with all the necessary institutional links both with the American West and 
the Russian East - we became witnesses of an accelerated opening-up of NATO 
for new members. The mightiest military institution in history and on earth, 
victorious and expanding but without a cause ! This existential problem was 
critical mainly for the USA, since the reason for its hegemonie presence in 
Europe had eclipsed. The unutterable publicly, of course, not only in the States 
but in Europe as well is checking perceived German future hegemonie pre­
sence in the continent adding new profoundly pro-American ex-Warsaw Pact 
countries aligning themselves four years later with the US war on Iraq. NATO 
was the only institutional form of America's presence in Europe. It was amidst 
the Kosovo war, that an urgent search of a new role for the NATO Alliance was 
promptly conceived and announced : In the name of Human Rights, it will be 
able to intervene in all parts of the world, building ad hoc « alliances of the 
3 The only link between the two is what The Economist approving - with reservations - the military inter­
vention would concede that « it was not just a just war to end Serb injustice, but also a war to preserve 
NATO's credibility ». « Return to pragmatism » (transi. Kathimerini), The Economist, 18/09/99. In this 
respect, I disagree on the traditional interpretation in search of high-ways for access to Middle-East oil 
(cf. Barratt Brown (Michael), « The Question of a third Balkan War », in Jaksic (Bozidar), ed., 
Interculturality, 1995, pp. 65-69. 
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willing ». Not one Kosovo but a multiplicity. The President allegedly, gave gui-
delines to the American Council of National Security to investigate which 
parts of the world ought to be « disciplined » for their violation of Human 
Rights4. Probably even if there was no Kosovo at hand the political and mili-
tary leadership of NATO would have had to invent it. Otherwise, there could be 
no raison d'être for NATO to continue. 
Images of destitute refugees, massacres by Serbian forces and bomb-in-
flicted destruction are accompanied during the whole campaign with what 
seems to escape from our attention : the great enthusiasm of Wall Street. The 
locomotive in this excitement was the military industry, the attached high-
tech enterprises, and the major media chains. This tightly knit web of econo-
mie interests sociologically forms the strongest lobby of interests in America. 
Kosovo and the wider area of Yugoslavia substituted more convincingly an ex-
hibition area, free of charge, projecting globally an image of terrific air-driven 
military equipment (within the prevailing global environment of high-tech 
commodity fetishism). This constitutes the additional element of economic 
interests since it is associated with an acceleration of orders to the US military 
industry. Economie interests, therefore, seem to be not in the traditional form, 
and if not in the forefront, in the not so transparent background. 
If we were to think of more specifie strategie designs for the USA, these 
would not be in the direction of classical strictly speaking territorial designs. 
For the US establishing itself as « arbiter of the earth » means determining im-
perially which war is moral and just and which is not. In this quest for more 
power and status, ad infinitum, interlinked categories of factors which have 
been put forward could be taken into consideration (graduai submission of 
Russia and/or the monitoring of China's reflexes after the bombing of its em-
bassy), a latent intangible Euro-American imbroglio. In fact in the financial co-
lumns of the US press the war in Yugoslavia was not always a « Balkan war » 
but it was often termed as a « European war », a motto which by itself weake-
ned dwindling Europe and its euro5. 
4 In the same spirit Blair in an article in The Guardian (28 t h June) asserted that the lessons for him to be 
drawn from Kosovo are more Kosovos. And for Fuller, ex-vice-chairman of the Council of National 
Security the additional « lesson from Kosovo is not to have escalations in such future attacks, but begin 
from the first night with a fully developed blitzkrieg ». See « Where Governance is Foul, watch for more 
Kosovos », The Washington Post and International Herald Tribune, 05/05/99. A preliminary report by 
NATO military experts confirms such tendencies endorsed by Wesley Clark, the American NATO supreme 
commander. The summary is published in the Daily Telegraph. The lesson to be drawn from the failure 
of air strikes against Serbian military targets is that in the future « the Alliance should aim, from the very 
first moment, to civilian targets like electric plants, water reservoirs, and oil refineries ». 
5A content analysis of titles and articles in The Wall street Journal and the financial insets of other major 
American dailies could substantiate, qualify or disprove this impression. 
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Conjectural subjectivist factors 
To concede that social and political forces are a necessary precondition in 
history does not mean that we consent to views preaching the eclipse of the 
crucial role of the individual actor. More so when the actor happens to be the 
President of the United States, the strongest man in a country that, in turn is 
the mightiest in the world. This actor is invested with all the power to decide 
for a war. The decision for this war is taken approximately one month after the 
end of a period lasting more than a year, marked by one and only one theme 
in American domestic life and the news diffused globally : Impeachment, the 
Oval Office and the related saga of the President and his internee. What is of 
interest is that all major American institutions are thoroughly involved with 
these proceedings : White House, Congress, Senate, Independent Prosecutor, 
the media, and of course public opinion On the one hand a moralistic - and for 
most European commentators - McCarthyist Republican opposition was stig-
matized. By numerous commentators at the time, he was believed to be cyni-
cal enough to bomb an aspirin factory in Sudan and have one more round of 
bombs raining over Iraq to divert public opinion or even if possible to avert im­
peachment6. With the prestige of the sole superpower and its President deeply 
injured, it is not that absurd to believe that sortie of the real life incentives for 
that war can be detected in the haughtiness, conceit and the irresistible desire 
to recuperate the lost prestige and glamour of the Presidency and the reasser­
tion of American greatness and superiority. 
The presidential factor could not be considered more than a favorable 
disposition never a necessary or sufficient condition for war, although no war 
could have been waged against the will of the American President. It is hard-
core interests, economic interests (of industries, financial markets), political 
and strategic (of States and inter-State institutions such as NATO) that make 
for the necessary conditions. 
WESTERN LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
THROUGH THE KOSOVO LOOKING-GLASS 
Wars have always been not only catastrophic but also revealing by illumi-
nating pre-existing inner societal trends in collective mentalities and practi-
ces. In the case of Kosovo all forms of violence converge and mutually reinforce 
one state of affairs : the end of dialogue, the end of reasoned deliberation. It is, 
of course, from within a critical tradition that we explore the impact of insti-
tutionalized force on autonomy, tolerance and democracy. In this section some 
6 See among others Rawnsley (Andrew) « Onward Christian soldier », The Observer, 23/05/99. 
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rudimentary thoughts are exposed apportioned in six domains - theoretical 
and institutional - linked with the prospects of democracy and civil society. 
Terrorism and National Sovereignty 
Three variants of nationalism and one of imperial hegemony were at 
work in Yugoslavia, undermining any concept of tolerance, civility and demo­
cracy. All four phenomena had aggressively (even when defined as defensive) 
the notion of sovereignty at the epicenter. Sovereignty not only with the 
strictly speaking formai legalistic content of the term, but as a state of affairs 
meaning that in exceptional situations a sovereign power can take decisions 
which are not constrained by law. The major difference in between the three 
variants of nationalist sovereignty on the one hand and US-NATO notion of so­
vereignty on the other is the traditional territorial aspects involved in the na­
tionalist variants and the symbolic unlimited global space for the latter va­
riant. All three variants of sovereignty involved in the Kosovo violence in one 
way or another ended up in as many different forms of terrorism, as a means 
for the imposition of their goals. State terrorism as applied by the Milosevic re­
gime (ending up within a decade in three un-declared consecutive wars on 
Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo), terrorist activities - irrespectively of its liberation 
end - of the UÇK (by itself undeclared unconventional war against the Serbs), 
and the terrorist function of the American Alliance's undeclared air-war 
against Yugoslavia. Three forms of terrorism complementing each other 
despite their proclaimed intent to eliminate each other. 
Representation and opinion polls 
Representative Systems and party mechanisms in the West appeared du-
ring these exceptional circumstances more as instruments of two categories of 
factors : interests and plebiscitary populism. In effect organized military, 
media and political interests having shaded even diplomatic activity7 strug-
gled for popular consent. Representative assemblies (such as parliaments) see-
med more than ever as if they were outmoded institutions. They served as no-
thing more than tools of legitimacy for decisions taken by the highest 
echelons of the executive, seriously undermining their autonomy as institu­
tions of free deliberations. The democratic process, people's will were substitu-
ted by their sheer simulation : public opinion polls dictating the terms of poli­
tical behavior. They constitute the new instruments of consent substituting 
not only representative institutions but even established constitutional order. 
7 It is this same element of money that has been associated with the military operations. In the case of 
Holbrook ending up the negotiations with Slovenia and Croatia a short while after they had fixed major 
economie deals with the Boston financial corporation he is representing in Eastern Europe. See The Wall 
Street Journal, 01/04/99. 
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Media and Propaganda 
Sheer propaganda and mainly the eclectic misinformation of the media 
have compromised the workings of liberal democracy (succumbing to NATO 
briefings, essentially saturating all prime time on the war with no other sour-
ces being sought for). Thousands of channels in Europe and America, allegedly 
independent from State authorities and allegedly struggling for truth and ob-
jectivity projected on the one hand the destitute image of the refugees and 
rightly so. But by reproducing to a great extent NATO briefings on the effects 
of bombing they systematically distorted the whole image. Most of the media 
unassumingly assimilated NATO terminology and reproduced all its basic ele-
ments as expressed in the various officiai briefings, usually without criticizing 
or even qualifying them. On a daily basis one could listen to an everlasting re-
cord of airplane exits - a real show-off of aerial might - followed by triumpha-
list tones on the destruction of military targets solely. Robert Menard8, generai 
secretary of the NGO « Reporters Sans Frontières » condemning the whole 
state of media affairs argued that journalists do not have the knowledge or the 
possibility to double-check military briefings and the disclosed information 
(which was just as true with the « embedded » journalists (accredited and 
trust-worthy) in the 2003 Iraq War). 
State-NGO relations 
A war has its serious repercussions at home. Within liberal pluralist 
theory Non-Governmental Organizations are viewed as independent, by defi-
nition, from the State. The role of the NGOs during conflicts and wars can be 
crucial if they can keep up with their impartiality in objectively informing pu-
blic opinion. They can function in a legitimating way but they can also func-
tion in a de-legitimizing critical direction. If the state imposes its order on civil 
society, then a disintegration of the autonomous workings of NGOs in crisis 
periods certainly means a lot for periods of peace as well. 
Referring to « the West » generally, what could be stated schematically is 
that a substantial number of NGOs associated with human rights, humanita-
rian and environmental activities found themselves, if not in dissonance with 
the theory, certainly in complete disarray. During the Kosovo war, it seems on 
the basis of well checked reports, that NGOs monitoring human, civil and mi-
nority rights such as « Amnesty International » and « Human Rights Watch » 
were particularly sensitive for the de-rooting, torturing and killing of 
Albanian refugees. But although they did not ignore the plea of Serbian civi-
lians killed by UÇK riffles and NATO bombing they did not condemn the ope-
ration. In fact, « International Helsinki Federation » openly with an officiai sta-
8 See Menaid (Robert), « NATO tried to misinform », Avgi, 06/07/99. 
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tement supported the bombing whereas it took fifteen months for AI to refer 
to war crimes committed by NATO9. The « Docteurs sans frontières » sent do-
zens of doctors to the Albanian refugee camps and rightly so. But they sent 
none within Serbia and Kosovo and this is condemnable. Pacifist organizations 
in the past very vocal, condemned Serbia, and very rightly so, but remained 
deadly silent, when they did not openly support, the bombings, thus contra-
dicting their-pacifist-nature. Committees monitoring minorities condemned 
ethnic cleansing by the Milosevic regime, nevertheless remained passive 
when the turn of the Serbs came to evacuate Kosovo under the terror of the 
Albanian UÇK and the KFOR inaction. Environmental NGOs (not to speak of 
Green parties) when they did not fully support the war remained unmoved 
about its toxic aftermath. They could not but be aware that the bombing of 
chemical plants and refineries could be lethal in the coming decades for hun-
dreds of thousands of civilians as reported in front page headlines of European 
and American papers. It thus seems that some of the NGOs associated with 
Human Rights and other humanitarian organizations not only acted on the 
basis of conditioned reflexes, but coordinated their actions with many NATO 
governments 1 0. As stated by Ulrich Beck, the German sociologist, within his 
(partly) enthusiastic support of the bombing « the Alliance was acting as if it 
was the right hand of Amnesty International »11. 
The conditions that prevailed can better be described as internalization by 
some NGOs of the raison d'État and their nationalisation as in the case of hu-
manitarian assistance. In a number of cases, even their funding seemed to be 
9 But when, Caria Del Ponte, the generai attorney of the special Hague Tribunal for war crimes decreed 
that there is no problem whatsoever, then AI limited its reaction to a sarcastic commentary without gi-
ving any further emphasis on the matter. AI, NATO/FRY : "Collateral Damage" or unlawful killings. 
Violations of the Laws of War by NATO during Operation Allied Force, May 2000. 
1 0 As reported in the American press and diffused in the European one, the State Department recruited 
humanitarian organizations to back the air-raids. The American Under-Secretary of State Harold Koch, in 
a meeting with leading cadres of NGOs, is reported by one of those attending to have said that « if they 
support with enthusiasm the intervention Mrs. Albright might meet them personally soon ». 
Counterpunch, May 1999 (electronic version, vrww.counterpunch.org [retransmitted by the International 
Action Centre, founded among others by the ex-general attorney Ramsey Clark]). 
1 1 Eight leading figures of International Humanitarian organisations condemned NATO, in a declaration 
published in Le Monde, for the use of their principles to cover up all sorts of other interests (political 
and/or military). An extract is more than indicative : « Tuer ou chercher à tuer même avec une volonté de 
parcimonie, pour sauver plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes ne saurait être qualifié d'humani-
taire (...). Confondre ce qui est juste et ce qui est accompli par humanité ; ce serait se prendre pour Dieu 
(...). Il faut admettre que l'OTAN agit en fonction de ses intérêts qui ne correspondent pas forcément à 
ceux des populations du Kosovo ni à ceux du monde humanitaire. Croire le contraire serait faire preuve 
d'une tragique naiveté (...). Ce n'est pas une affaire de moyens, mais de principes, l'OTAN, et les armées 
qui la composent, ne sont pas, ne seront pas et ne doivent pas devenir une force humanitaire (...). En ha-
billant une guerre de motifs humanitaires, le risque est grand de justifier des violences et d'autres souf-
frances. C'est exposer l'action humanitaire libre et indépendante au discrédit à la suspicion, au danger et, 
partant, à la paralysie ». See Bettati (Mario), (a declaration with six other presidents of NGOs), « Qu'est-
ce que l'humanitaire ? », Le Monde, 15/05/99. 
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dependent exclusively on the basis of their orientation and nationality12. More 
generally, it seems that much is left to be re-examined of NGOs and of Civil 
Society not only in the European East but also in the West. 
Civility at home and its lack abroad 
A civil society respectful of its civility cannot be transformed into an « un-
civil society » in periods of crisis. It cannot be civil at home and support dozens 
of « uncivil » and « anti-civil » societies abroad and continue being considered 
as « civil ». It cannot impose its definition of « civility » by uncivilian means. A 
crucial litmus test is its treatment of laws and legal institutions-national and 
international-in crisis periods. But, there is the ever-present dualism of legal 
and constitutional values or ideals and their real implementation carried out 
and guarded by institutions - national and international - themselves under 
the direct influence of the major powers. If a web of regulations are compro-
mised in such periods, if institutions of justice surrender to the whims of the 
executive power, much remains to be desired for the workings of democracy, 
not only in extreme periods of war but also in periods of peace. If an essential 
part of the workings of democracy is the functioning of its legal and constitu­
tional system we cannot set aside what was stated in a condemnatory tone by 
Marcus Raskin, co-founder of the prestigious US Institute for Policy Studies. 
Undeclared wars have terrible consequences for the rule of law, a cardinal princi-
ple of constitutional democracies. (...) Whatever the motives [of the Kosovo war] 
the message given to the American citizenry is that law does not matter when an 
executive intends to act in an imperial and uncontrolled manner. It is Congress's 
role to declare war. Nevertheless, examples abound in which Congress's passive 
role in military actions abroad has failed to protect this basic constitutional 
power...13 
It sounds as if what was stated within a different context and another his-
torical conjecture could be true once again : i.e. that most constitutional theory 
may turn out to be junk, if we accept that sovereign authority is he who deci­
des what is normality and what is the exception to it. 
Of direct relevance in testing « civility » in international relations of sta-
tes, in the new human rights environment, is the stand towards the 
International Court of Justice. Four factors have to be stressed : 
1 2 Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross will add that « the ca­
ricature of war could lead to discrimination against the victims since there will be the "good victims" of 
the humanitarian side and the "bad victims" among those who oppose the "humanitarian" interven­
tion ». See Sommaruga (Cornelio), « Renew the Ambition to Impose Rules of Warfare », International 
Herald Tribune, 12/08/99. 
13 See Raskin (Marcus), « An Undeclared War in nowhere-Land », Washington Post and International 
Herald Tribune, 06/05/99. 
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- The workings of such penal procedures are dependent on the release of 
information from Intelligence sources. But only the US and Britain could have 
access to such info. The testimonial material on the basis of which the Serbian 
leadership was indicted was released by American administration intelligence 
sources with a timing and a direction that laissé à désirer. Thus, not only for po-
litical reasons but also for technological ones it seems extremely difficult to 
collect the sort of evidence necessary to inculpate the USA for war crimes. 
- A second factor is drawn from the ironies and contradictions of the his-
torico-political conjuncture. During the same period, whereas Milosevic is 
« wanted » for crimes, the U.S.A. exerts immense pressure on Britain for the 
dropping of the charges and the release of another dictator : Pinochet. It just 
happens that the latter one « was our lad in Chile ». 
- The flagrant use of double standards in the very same conflict for the op-
posing sides is one more factor undermining the West's position, since 
America, the leading nation is compromised14. 
- The fourth factor is directly associated with the previous one. During this 
same period the project of an International Court for Criminals of War is se-
riously discussed as the most important practical step for the promotion of 
international justice. One of the few countries refusing to ratify it is the U.S.15. 
Thus, by its stand, the US, the most vocal champion of human rights, continues 
1 4 According to Jonathan Miller, professor of constitutional law, some of the same criteria used for the 
conviction of Milosevic are just as applicable for the bombing of Serbia and Kosovo to the U.S. President 
and the leadership of NATO. « NATO officiais, senior military officers and even common servicemen 
could be persecuted by the tribunal if bombings are not dictated by military necessity (...). The need to 
maintain impartiality will inevitably require [judge Louise Arbour] to caution NATO officiais on their 
bombing targets, if she has not done so already (...). The U.S. for the first time in its history finds itself en-
gaged in an armed conflict in which an International Court may correctly insist that it may try U.S. offi­
ciais and servicemen ». See Miller (Jonathan), « Be careful, Waging War against Civilians Is against the 
Law », Los Angeles Times and International Herald Tribune, 13/05/99. His allegations for « possible war 
crimes » are corroborated by Walter Rockler, Public Prosecutor for the American side in the Nuremberg 
trials. He states : « In terms of International law the present engagement of this war by the USA and 
NATO constitutes a continuous war crime. Contrary to the perceptions of our military leadership, the li-
mitless air-bombings are forbidden by International Law ». See Rockler (Walter), « War criminals Clinton 
and the leaders of NATO », Chicago Tribune reprinted in Ta Nea, 31/05/99. In the same vein Jimmy Carter, 
ex-President of the U.S., after accusing the American government for trespassing all international insti­
tutions and laws, concludes : « Even for the world's only superpower, the ends don't always justify the 
means ». See Carter (Jimmy), « As a Peacemaker, America Is Blundering Badly », The New York Times and 
International Herald Tribune, 28/05/99. 
1 5 As reported by Marcel Berlins, the country that most vehemently opposes and refuses to sign the in­
stitution of such a Court is America (Berlins (Marcel), « The Limits of Justice in the New Order », The 
Guardian, translated In Greek in Kathimerini, 11/07/99). Berlins' observation is corroborated by Ignacio 
Ramonet, editor of the monthly Le Monde Diplomatique : « The United States has refused to support the 
international convention to establish an international criminal court, thereby making its claim that al-
leged war criminals should be held personally accountable little more than a propaganda ploy » 
(Ramonet (Ignacio), « Nouvel Ordre global », Le Monde Diplomatique, June 1999). 
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what it has been doing in the past by either not ratifying international rules 
and regulations or not applying some it has cosigned. 
The rule of democratic law at home is a precondition to show concern for 
the rule of law internationally. In fact within a democratic frame of thinking 
and acting, international institutions cannot function as a substitute of natio­
nal laws and Constitutions16. But not to ratify a whole series of international 
conventions, not to enforce such laws and dumping those same International 
institutions such as the United Nations themselves, conceived in the post-WWII 
period with prevalent American notions, disallows the role of champion of 
human rights and justice globally17. Having bypassed their constitutions, ha-
ving ignored international institutions and having abolished in practice inter­
national laws, all that is left is the will of one country (and at the time its 
Alliance) over all others to clarify the link between moral theory and its im-
plementation. These seem to be the real vectors of the New World Order. 
Organic and Critical Intellectuals 
The role of intellectuals in the past century has been crucial in critically 
exposing decisions and acts of the various powers, thus acting as an additional 
factor in the workings of democracy and in the quality of what has corne to be 
described as civil society. What was in this sense a novel situation for the first 
time in this « short 20 t h century » was that most intellectuals of the Balkan 
East and the European West closed ranks with their respective governments. In 
the case of Yugoslavia, since the mid-1980s, it was academia that first and fo-
remost openly and collectively expressed Serbian nationalist ideology in a ma­
nifesto without ever raising their voice even to genocidal practices in Bosnia 
and ethnie cleansing in Kosovo. In the case of Albanian irredentist nationa-
lism, the local intelligentsia also closed ranks. It is on the above demarcation 
lines that mainstream nationalist intellectuals either condemned NATO bom-
bing having previously supported the bombing of Sarajevo by the Serbian 
1 6 The United Nations have a crucial role to play, as Elaine Scarry insightfully points out, « if and only if 
any act of national aggression requires their authorization in addition to the constitutionally mandated 
congressional or parliamentary authorization of the home country ». She will add, that reading the pri-
vate papers of U.S. presidents throughout the twentieth century leads one to the following remark : 
« Again and again, a president will openly acknowledge how much easier it is to secure UN authoriza­
tion than Congressional authorization for an act of international aggression he has wished to initiate ». 
Scarry (Elaine), « The difficulty of imagining other people », in Nussbaum (Martha), Cohen (Joshua), eds., 
For Love of Country : Debating the Limits ofPatriotism, Boston : Beacon Press, 1996, p. 109. 
17 Ralf Dahrendorf will go even further : In his liberal critique on Blair-Giddens and Schroder [Beck -I 
would add) assumed « Third Way' he will include NATO decisions "about war and peace within the too 
many authoritarian temptations (...) not subject to democratie controls" (...) invariably mean[ing] a loss 
of democracy ». Dahrendorf (Ralf), The Third Way and Liberty. An Authoritarian Streak in Europe's New 
Center », Foreign Affairs, 78 (5), October 1999. 
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army (Serbian academics) or supported NATO bombing as a step towards in-
dependence (Albanian intellectuals)18. 
But what sounds to me more of a curiosum, is how Western ex-May 1968 
academies and intellectuals reacted to NATO bombing. How and why ex-
Maoists, Trotskyites, Eurocommunists and present pacifists and environmen-
talists, succumbed to the NATO rationale ? How and why so many liberal in­
tellectuals thoroughly believing that « blessed ends do not justify evil means » 
closed ranks supporting the expedition ? It is even more strange how acade­
mies identified with post-modernist and deconstructivist currents (with the 
exception of Derrida, the French father of deconstructionism)19, having for 
long periods de-constructed the concept of the one and only one officiai nar­
rative of « the true », « the objective » and « the beautiful », having dissolved 
the one and sole Western Canon, and in the ideological sphere having fruit-
fully deconstructed the concept of the « nation-state », were led with the grea-
test ease to endorse, if not with fundamentalist fervor, with reservations the 
absoluteness of the « heavy metal » NATO-narrative. This is depicted in their 
political rationale and the historical background they depicted. The above all-
sweeping generalization of academies refers to the great majority, albeit, here 
as well there were, of course, few distinguished and honorable exceptions2 0. 
If one could generalize it seems that if in the 1990s academies and intel­
lectuals in the several republics of ex-Yugoslavia provided as a rule all the 
ideological-cultural material for all types of competitive nationalisms, in the 
West, during the Kosovo war, they, as a rule, provided NATO leadership with a 
1 8 There were, of course, courageous exceptions. In Serbia Bozidar Jaksic, Ranko Bugarski, Nebojsa Popov 
and hundreds of critical intellectuals around the Belgrade Circle, Institutes and departments of Social 
Sciences and Philosophy, NGOs monitoring Human Rights ; in Albania and Kosovo we had dissenting voi-
ces, even if necessarily carefully worded : the Albanian minister of culture, Rugova, the only elected lea­
der of the Kosovar Albanians and the president of the Human Rights association condemned violence ir-
respectively of its source. 
19 Jacques Derrida, consistent with his overall theory of challenging and « deconstructing » the notion of 
« Sovereignty-National Sovereignty » organically linking it with the defense of human and minority 
rights condemned all forces struggling for national statist domination in Yugoslavia such as, the 
Milosevic regime, and the UÇK. In a written lecture he condemned NATO as incarnating the « mecha-
nisms, stratagems, and the lies through which the venerable discourse of human rights is adapted un-
justly and eclectically to the hegemonie intentions of some ethno-statist superpowers ». (See Bitsoiis 
(Vangelis), « Resistance or indivisible Sovereignty of the nation-state ? » Kyriakatiki Avgi, 25/07/99 and 
Nea Estia, October 1999 (In Greek). 
2 0 With the obvious danger of omitting some of the critical intellectuals voicing their reaction to the mi-
litary intervention, allow me, to note some I managed to detect : Noam Chomsky, Edward Said, Immanuel 
Wallerstein, Gunter Frank, Gore Vidal and others around the journal The Nation in the USA, Erick 
Hobsbawm, Martin Jacques, Tariq Ali, Harold Pinter, the Oxford circle of academies and experts on 
Balkan and East Mediterranean history, society and politics, among whom John Campbell, Richard Clogg, 
Peter Mackridge and Renee Hirschon, others around the daily The Independent in England, Pierre 
Bourdieu, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Regis Debray, Ignacio Ramonet, Gilbert Achcar and the circles around the 
journals Liber, Actes Sociales and Le Monde Diplomatique in France, Peter Handke, Willie Brandt but not 
Jurgen Habermas and Ulrich Beck in Germany. 
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raison d'être (albeit no so at least among European intellectuals after the Iraq 
war five years later). They emerged as the troubadours of the modem globally 
sovereign prince who, instead of stigmatizing the mighty for their abuse of 
power, protected them from the rule of internai and international law. A typo-
logy of the stands taken by various trends of intellectuals and various schools 
of thought and academic departments is, of course, still a desideratum. For 
those of us viewing the university along with Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques Derrida 
and Immanuel Wallerstein, as a bastion of resistance to all kinds of totalizing 
propaganda and of idées reçues and as a center for the theoretical deepening 
of democracy, and civil society, the clarification of its role during this critical 
period is an urgent first priority. 
INCONCLUSIVE CONCLUDING REMARKS 
What has been analyzed, is what I think, constitutes two self-delusions of 
the great majority of Western intellectuals and opinion-leaders. First major 
self-delusion : they took for granted NATO rhetoric, as if it reflected their own 
way of thinking on Human Rights, as if it reflected their own concerns for the 
perpetrated ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. NATO's clear rationality sounded as if 
it was springing from the application of some sort of « pure reason ». They 
were thus, led to support the decision by NATO to use military means succum-
bing unconsciously to what has been termed « the hypocrisy of American 
Kantianism ». 2 1 
The second collective self-delusion of most European intellectuals is that 
they came to unconditionally believe that the violation of Human Rights (eth-
nie cleansing) in Kosovo constituted in reality if not the sole, certainly the most 
important cause of the military intervention. It was as if they did not realize 
that two distinct discourses were at work from the very beginning of the 
conflict : on the one hand the media and political variants of human rights dis-
course on the other, a close-circuit discourse reflected in few texts by decision 
makers and reports by experts, strategie research institutes close to decision 
making centers. This latter discourse was solely about interests - conflicting 
interests (of States) strategie interests (of strong States and alliances) even 
petty interests of leaders, or a combination of the above - and only to the ex-
tent that the drifting public opinion was at stake the use and abuse of a mora-
listic discourse on Human Rights was generated. A relativist discourse can be 
detected through time : the Gulf War in 1990 is fought in the name of the sa-
crosanct national sovereignty of Kuwait trespassed by Iraq. Nine years later, in 
2 1 Wallerstein (Immanuel), « Neither Patriotism nor Cosmopolitanism », in Nussbaum (Martha), Cohen 
(Joshua), eds., op.cit. 
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1999, the criterion of sovereignty is totally abandoned, and in a world sans 
frontières - only for the mighty - in the name of Human Rights Yugoslavia is 
bombed. Two years later both criteria of national sovereignty and of human 
rights are dismissed and substituted by « the war against terror » : 
Afghanistan is bombed. Finally Iraq is invaded in the name of destroying arms 
of mass destruction, not to be detected. Absolute moral and political relativism 
is in full swing. 
The Kosovo war was not fought by intellectuals writing and thinking on 
Human Rights and justice and with the faith characterizing their theoretical 
projects. It was a war fought by generais and politicians (not to mention the pi-
lots). The key word in understanding is interests and, not what constitutes a 
purposeful Neo-neo-Hegelian delusion pour épater les intellectuels (and public 
opinion) i.e. the respect of human rights of the Albanian minority in 
Yugoslavia, an otherwise real and major problem as such. What most critically 
thinking people were demanding during the 1990s was not the passive indif-
ference of the West, but its positive presence and intervention on the side of 
dissident forces with all possible means except one : the military means. It is 
on this basis that I refer to biased « false sentiments » or « false concerns » : It 
seems that the complexity of the issues involved does not allow for multiva-
lent sentiments of compassion nor for the condemnation of perpetrators of 
all origins. 
We know it, that even the worst turning points in history have left, or have 
led to, some sort of positive legacy (real or imagined) : in the mid-17 th century 
the bloody Thirty Years War led to the birth of secular notions, in the late 1 8 t h 
century the Terror linked with the French Revolution led to the principles of 
Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité for all citizens, World War II with the Holocaust, the 
apex of bestiality, to the institution of a whole network of organizations and 
rules of international validity associated with crimes against humanity and 
charters on Human and Minority Rights. I would certainly not concede that 
such massive loss of human life was through the centuries ever worth it. In 
this context we could only hope for a new content for politics. The ideal or uto-
pian political and intellectual objective not only for the Balkans but for the 
West would be, endorsing what was once stated by Emmanuel Levinas : « a dif-
ferent figuration of politics, one in which its purpose is the struggle for-or on 
behalf of-otherness, and not a struggle to efface, erase, or eradicate other-
ness » 2 2. 
Andromache : « The War of Tioy did not take place » 
(In the meanwhile Hector's dead corpse is being dragged behind Achilles’ chariot). 
2 2 Quoted in Campbell (David), « The Deterritorialization of Responsibility : Levinas, Derrida and Ethics 
after the End of Philosophy », Alternatives, 19 (4), 1994, p. 463. 
